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Abstract
The Ngobe are Panama’s most populous indigenous group. While the Ngobe that live in
the comarca have land and resource rights, those that live immediately outside of it do not. This
issue has been exacerbated by the creation of Palo Seco Forest Reserve which has removed all
land rights from the Ngobe living within it. In order to meet its growing demand for energy,
Panama is expanding its hydroelectric sector. One such hydroelectric dam built by AES is Chan
75. However, Chan 75 has had a controversial history, especially regarding its treatment of the
Ngobe people of the corregimiento Nance del Risco. The purpose of this study was to examine
how land use has changed since the construction of the Chan 75 dam and how dam construction
has impacted the livelihoods of community members in Nance del Risco. To assess this,
vegetation change and forest loss analyses were run using Landsat satellite imagery.
Additionally, a case study of the impacts of the dam on the Garcia family, who lived in Valle el
Rey and were relocated by AES, was completed through interviews with 9 family members.
Interviews were also conducted with community members from 6 other families impacted by the
dam. It was found that vegetation near the reservoir and forest across Nance del Risco have
decreased since the construction of the Chan 75 dam. Moreover, the dam has decreased the
quality of life for the Garcia family, causing issues of transportation, money, and food
availability which have in turn caused them to expand their agricultural land use. Similar
problems were reported by the other families. Now, as more and more dams are planned and
under construction across Panama, it is time to rethink the effects of hydroelectric dams on the
communities that they are built in.
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Introduction
History of the Ngobe
The Ngobe are the most populous, fastest growing, and most impoverished of Panama’s
indigenous groups (Stoike 2009). As of the 2010 census, there were 277,242 Ngobe in Panama,
and it was projected that there would be 344,443 Ngobe by 2020 (Instituto Nacional de
Estadistica y Censo 2010). Further, the Ngobe population quadrupled from 1960 to 2000.
According to the Government of Panama, 86% of Ngobe live in extreme poverty (Stoike 2009).
Traditionally, the Ngobe have relied on subsistence agriculture, hunting, fishing, and the
gathering of wild plants to survive (Del Rosario 2011). Historically, the arrival of Europeans to
the continent and warfare among indigenous groups during the 16th century drove the Ngobe into
the mountainous regions of Western Panama that they largely inhabit today (Wickstrom 2003).
Specifically, the largest Ngobe populations are found in the provinces of Bocas del Toro,
Chiriqui, and Veraguas and the Ngoble-Bugle Comarca (Lux 2010).
The Ngobe-Bugle Comarca was created by the National Assembly of Panama under Law
10 in 1997. With the comarca status came collective land ownership and legal recognition of
Ngobe ethnic-cultural institutions for the territory (Del Rosario 2011). In 1998, Law 41, the
General Environmental Law, further guaranteed the right of indigenous people to control and
develop lands and resources within comarcas. Although the Ngobe received comarca status for
650,000 hectares, that is only half of their traditional territory (Wickstrom 2003). Further, an
estimated 40% of Ngobe live outside of the designated comarca (Barber 2008). However, Article
2 of Law 10 proposed the creation of annex areas that would have similar collective ownership
and traditional representation rights as the comarca. These included 15 expressly named annex
areas and any communities inhabited by more than 300 Ngobe. These areas were meant to be
demarcated 20 months after the law was passed in 1997, but the extents still have not yet been
described (Lux 2010).
Creation of Palo Seco Forest Reserve
Palo Seco Forest Reserve is a 167,410-hectare protected area that was created in 1983. It
was created to act as a buffer to protect La Amistad International Park from land invasion and for
the development of hydropower resources (Lux 2010). However, it was created from territory
claimed by indigenous communities, including the Ngobe, and there were existing settlements
within the area. Despite this, indigenous groups were not consulted during the creation of the
protected area (Mayhew et al. 2009). In 2006, there were approximately 5,144 Ngobe living in
Palo Seco, and the Ministerio de Ambiente was aware that these communities buy, sell, and lease
land within the protected area. However, the Ministerio de Ambiente claims that legal
possessions and titles do not exist within Palo Seco (Lux 2010). Much of the land in Palo Seco
Forest Reserve is encompassed by the Changuinola-Teribe watershed, a water shed that is almost
entirely in the province of Bocas del Toro (Barber 2008).
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Development of Bocas del Toro
The Ngobe have traditionally been the main inhabitants of the province of Bocas del
Toro, mostly living in the archipelago and on the mainland around the city of Changuinola.
Historically, the province has been isolated, in turn isolating the Ngobe that lived there.
However, political stability following the end of the Noriega regime in 1989 has made Panama a
center for foreign investment. This stability and investment have changed the Bocas del Toro
archipelago into a popular tourist destination (Lux 2010). This tourism began relatively
spontaneously towards the end of the 1990s (Claiborne 2010). Now, relatively recent tourism
laws have incentivized tourism-related property purchases. Additionally, all non-titled
inhabitants of the archipelago are required to purchase property rights at market price or vacate
their homes to create space for further development (Stein 2008).
Although these laws only apply to land in the archipelago, land competition in Palo Seco
Forest Reserve has increased as former inhabitants of the islands are forced to leave (Stein 2008).
This rapid development and displacement has continued without respect for traditional Ngobe
land rights or annex areas (Lux 2010). Additionally, there has been significant movement of
Ngobe to urban areas in Bocas del Toro, mainly Changuinola (Thampy 2013). As of 2007,
20.3% of all Ngobe living in urban areas lived in Changuinola (Del Popolo et al. 2007). This
migration can be partially explained by the rapid population growth of the Ngobe and the lack of
other education and job opportunities (Thampy 2013). Between growing tourism and
urbanization, the increasing demand for land, water, and electricity has put pressure on natural
resources across Bocas del Toro (Lux 2010). Now, the Panamanian government has focused on
developing hydroelectric dams across the province of Bocas del Toro.
Hydroelectric Dams in Panama
Hydroelectric dams are often promoted as clean alternatives to fossil fuels. Currently,
hydroelectricity is the main source of power across Central America. Given the anticipated rapid
growth in electricity demand in the region over the coming decades, the development of the
power sector is necessary to ensure the efficiency and security of power. Much of this
development is occurring in the hydroelectric sector (Barbosa et al. 2017). Another strategy for
combating this demand was the construction of the Interconnected Electric System of Central
American Countries (SIEPAC). SIEPAC, completed in 2013, connected transmission lines to
one power grid from Guatemala to Panama, allowing these countries to sell power to each other
(Kathuria et al. 2015). Although one goal was to provide energy for growing demands, Panama
already produced more energy annually than they used and intended to sell additional power,
especially from current hydroelectric projects (Barber 2008). Between June 2013 and December
2015, Panama made $22 million exporting energy through SIEPAC (Echevarria et al. 2017).
Although, hydroelectric dams have proven able to meet the growing electricity demand
thus far, they also have been criticized for creating other environmental and social issues. In
terms of environmental impacts, dams often flood natural habitats, change downriver hydrology,
release greenhouse gases, and cause the loss of both aquatic and terrestrial wildlife. In terms of
social impacts, dams frequently reduce water quality, increase water-related diseases, cause loss
of cultural property, and result in the involuntary displacement of previous inhabitants (World
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Commission on Dams 2000). As of 2000, between 40 and 80 million people had been relocated
for hydroelectric dams globally. However, this displacement is more than physical and often
causes social, cultural, and livelihood disruption for those impacted (Finley-Brook and Thomas
2010).
In Panama, 57.4% of power generation is supplied by hydroelectric plants (Secretaria
Nacional de Energia 2016). As of 2008, hydroelectric dams generated approximately 800 MW of
power, and 3 dams produced 86% of the hydroelectric power in Panama. These dams were
Fortuna at 300 MW, Bayano at 260 MW, and Esti at 120 MW. At the time, there were further
plans for 23 potential hydroelectric plants across Panama with the highest power potential in the
provinces of Bocas del Toro, Chiriqui, and Veraguas (Giardinella et al. 2011). Since 2008,
Panama has completed some of these planned hydroelectric dams, including the 33 MW Bonyik
dam and the 223 MW Chan 75. Currently, hydroelectric dams generate 1,623 MW of power. The
Panamanian government now plans to expand this capacity to 2,389.1 MW through 95 identified
new hydroelectric projects (Secretaria Nacional de Energia 2016).
However, these dams have not been without controversy in Panama. The Bayano dam,
for example, was Panama’s first major dam and was completed in 1976 (Scudder 2005).
Although prior to dam construction it was estimated that only 450 people would need to relocate,
in actuality 4,500 were forced to relocate. These included 1,500 Kuna and 500 Embera, two of
Panama’s indigenous groups. The proposed total compensation for landholders was only
$200,000. Many Kuna, the most organized and persistent group during negotiations, received
only $4,500 each (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). By 1989, both indigenous groups had
become marginalized, losing both economic and social status to new migrants (Scudder 2005). In
2013, Panama was found in violation of the American Convention on Human Rights by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) for its handling of the construction of
the Bayano dam (IACHR 2013). Likewise, the Bonyik dam was built on the Bonyik River within
Palo Seco Forest Reserve, but it was built in the indigenous Naso territory. The construction of
this dam created a schism in the Naso community in 2004 when the king gave permission to the
Panamanian government and a Colombian firm to build it. It is also suspected that the
construction of the dam played a role in the failure of the Naso to gain comarca status in 2005
(World Bank Inspection Panel 2010). The construction of the Chan 75 dam has similarly had a
history of controversy.
History of Chan 75
The Chan 75, or Changuinola I, dam was built by AES, a Fortune 500 Company based in
Arlington, Virginia, United States. AES produces and distributes electricity in 29 different
countries and, as of 2008, made 83% of its revenue outside of the United States (Finley-Brook
and Thomas 2010). AES is also the largest energy provider in Panama, controlling 33% of power
generation in Panama as of 2008 (Giardinella et al. 2011). As of 2010, AES owned four dams in
Panama (including the Bayano dam) and were acquiring a fifth (Finley-Brook and Thomas
2010). Currently, AES is also building a 381 MW natural gas power plant in Colon, Panama
(Secretaria Nacional de Energia 2016).
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In 1981, the Panamanian state-run electric company described the hydroelectric
generation potential of the Changuinola River, and these descriptions influenced the delineation
of Palo Seco Forest Reserve. In 2004, as potential corporate interest for a project grew, the first
community response was issued with 14 communities surrounding the dam releasing a joint
declaration against it. In 2005, Hydro Teribe completed an Environmental Impact Assessment,
and it was approved by the Ministerio de Ambiente despite opposition. Hydro Teribe was then
bought out by AES, and AES assumed the project (Barber 2008).
In 2007, the Ministerio de Ambiente granted AES a 6,215-hectare concession to build a
hydroelectric dam along the Changuinola River in the Palo Seco Forest Reserve (Barber 2008).
The Panamanian government claimed that, because the annex demarcations were never actually
agreed upon, this concession was not within an annex area and thus does not have the rights of a
comarca (Lux 2010). Further, because the dam concession for Chan 75 and the surrounding
communities were located within the Palo Seco Forest Reserve, the Panamanian government
claimed that the local populations had no land rights and their consent was unnecessary for the
concession or construction of the dam (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). However, if, annex
areas had been properly addressed and delimited, the Ngobe would have been in a better position
to negotiate the terms and conditions of the concession (World Bank Inspection Panel 2010; Map
1).
The Panamanian government supported and continues to support the construction of
Chan 75 because Bocas del Toro suffers from regular blackouts, the dam increases Panama’s
position in the Central American electrical market, and the dam can displace 600,000 tons of
carbon dioxide compared to thermal plants (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Additionally, as a
part of the concession contract, AES must pay the Ministerio de Ambiente $550,000 every year
for the contract and $200,000 every year to maintain Palo Seco Forest Reserve. The contract was
for 20 years with the ability to be renewed for periods of 20 more years (Anaya 2009).
Originally, it was estimated that the dam would flood approximately 750 hectares (Stein
2007). It was also estimated that approximately 1,000 people, mostly Ngobe, would be displaced
and 3,500 would be otherwise affected by the construction and inundation (Stoike 2009). AES
estimated that 178 households over four communities in Nance del Risco needed to be resettled
for the construction of the dam (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). Despite Ngobe resistance in
the forms of petitions, protests, and blockading, the dam was completed (Stoike 2009). The four
displaced communities were Valle el Rey, Charco la Pava, Guayabal, and Changuinola Arriba,
and they were resettled without free, prior, and informed consent. According to the concession,
AES was responsible for negotiating, relocating, and compensating community inhabitants that
were directly or indirectly affected by the project (Anaya 2009).
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Map 1: Map of the Chan 75 reservoir within Palo Seco Forest Reserve and Bocas del Toro.
Green represents protected areas in Panama.
Nance del Risco
Corregimientos are the smallest political units in Panama, and Nance del Risco is the
corregimiento that both the Chan 75 dam and the displaced communities are in (Map 2). The
corregimiento of Nance del Risco was created in 2009 by Law 18. Before that, these
communities were part of the larger corregimiento of Valle del Risco (Republica de Panama
2009). According to the 2010 census, Nance del Risco covers 1,052.4 km2 and has a population
of 1,760. 96.31% of this population is Ngobe. On average, there are 6.4 habitants per home. The
median age is 14, and the reported median monthly income for people older than 10 is $433.
70.6% of habitants over 10 reported having no economic activity. Out of the 271 households in
the corregimiento, 53.9% do not have potable water, and 75.6% do not have electricity (Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica y Censo 2010).
Between the four displaced communities, there are 612 habitants across 93 households.
Of these households, 39.8% do not have potable water, and 69.9% do not have electricity. 98.9%
of the population of these four communities are Ngobe. Only 379 (or 61.9%) of the habitants of
these communities are older than 10, and of these, 69.9% reported having no economic activity.
On average, there are 6.8 habitants per house. Finally, the reported median monthly income for
people older than 10 is $476 for habitants of Charco la Pava and Valle el Rey, $400 for habitants
of Changuinola Arriba, and $100 for habitants of Guayabal (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Censo 2010). However, these statistics do not account for community members staying outside
of the communities for school, seasonal work, or other reasons.
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Map 2: 2010 census map of the corregimiento of Nance del Risco.
The implications and predicted impacts of the Chan 75 dam on these communities and
Nance del Risco were studied before and during the construction of the Chan 75 dam. However,
no research has been conducted on the actual land use and livelihood changes following the
construction of the Chan 75 dam on the nearby Ngobe communities in the corregimiento of
Nance del Risco.
Research Question
Has land use changed since the construction of the Chan 75 dam, and how has dam construction
impacted the livelihoods of the Garcia family and other community members in Nance del Risco,
Bocas Del Toro?
Research Objectives
•
•

To examine broad land use changes and patterns from before and after the construction of
the Chan 75 dam in the Nance del Risco corregimiento
To examine one specific case of land use and livelihood changes from before and after
the construction of the Chan 75 dam in Nance del Risco through the Garcia family and
their neighbors
10

Methods
Vegetation Change and Forest Loss
To examine broad land use changes and patterns, vegetation change and forest loss were
assessed from before and after the construction of Chan 75. The corregimiento Nance del Risco
was used as the study area because it is the smallest Panamanian political unit that contains the
Chan 75 dam and reservoir. Within the corregimiento, analyses were also conducted on the area
of the current reservoir, the area within one kilometer of the current reservoir, the area between
one and two kilometers of the current reservoir, and all area in the corregimiento beyond two
kilometers of the current reservoir (Map 3).
A

B

Map 3: Map of areas of interest for satellite imagery calculations.
Using United States Geological Survey Landsat satellite imagery, Normalized Difference
Vegetation Index (NDVI) values were calculated and used to represent vegetation density
(Tucker 1979). Comparing NDVI values from different periods can be used to examine
vegetation change in tropical forests (Horton et al. 2017). 4 images were selected from the
Landsat-7 Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plus (ETM+) archive from before the dam (Table 1). 4
images were also selected from the Landsat-8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) archive from after
the dam (Table 2). All images were from Path 14 Row 54 of each satellite’s orbit. Images
selected had less than 10% land cloud cover and were taken between December and January to
minimize temporal differences. Images from before the dam were taken in 2001 or 2006. Images
from after the dam were taken between 2013 and 2017.
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Landsat-7 ETM+ Selected Images
LE07_L1TP_014054_20011201_20170202_01_T1
LE07_L1TP_014054_20011217_20170201_01_T1
LE07_L1TP_014054_20060113_20170111_01_T1
LE07_L1TP_014054_20061215_20170105_01_T1
Table 1: Identifications for the 4 selected Landsat-7 ETM+ images used for NDVI calculations
from before the dam.
Landsat-8 OLI Selected Images
LC08_L1TP_014054_20140127_20170426_01_T1
LC08_L1TP_014054_20151216_20170331_01_T1
LC08_L1TP_014054_20170119_20170311_01_T1
LC08_L1TP_014054_20131226_20170427_01_T1
Table 2: Identifications for the 4 selected Landsat-8 OLI images used for NDVI calculations
from after the dam.
Landsat-7 ETM+ and Landsat-8 OLI provide 30 m resolution images for the bands of
interest. For each pixel, NDVI calculations were completed using the formula
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 4 − 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 3
𝑁𝐷𝑉𝐼𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑡−7 𝐸𝑇𝑀+ =
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 4 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 3
for Landsat-7 ETM+ images or
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 5 − 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 4
𝑁𝐷𝑉𝐼𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑎𝑡−8 𝑂𝐿𝐼 =
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 5 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑 4
for Landsat-8 OLI images (Li et al. 2014).
After NDVI values were calculated for each pixel, the images from each satellite were
merged. Overlapping pixels were selected based on the maximum NDVI value. This process was
used to eliminate cloud interference from the images (Holben 1986). Finally, the average NDVI
and standard deviation were calculated for each area of interest from the merged images from
before and after the dam. All calculations were done in QGIS 3.0.1.
To assess forest loss, global forest change data from Hansen/UMD/Google/USGS/NASA
was used. This data is available through Global Forest Watch and can be used to assess tropical
forest loss (Bikié et al. 2000). For this data, approximate area of forest loss is available for each
year from 2001 to 2016. The data defines forest loss as a change from a forest to non-forest state.
Only pixels classified as having greater than 30% canopy density were considered forest for this
calculation. The data has 30 m resolution, and each pixel has been assigned a value of either 0
for no loss or 1-16 representing what year the loss was detected (Hansen et al. 2013). For each
area of interest, the hectares of forest loss were calculated for each year. Then, the hectares of
forest loss were divided by the total hectares of the area of interest. This provided a measure of
the percent of forest loss in the area.
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Community Member Interviews
The full extent of land use and livelihood changes caused by the construction of the Chan
75 dam are complex and intertwining. It was quickly apparent that it would be impossible to
understand the full breadth of these changes from satellite imagery alone. To examine land use
and livelihood changes on individuals and families, members of impacted communities were
interviewed about their experiences before and after the construction of the Chan 75 dam. All
interviewees lived in the corregimiento of Nance del Risco before the construction of the dam.
Interviewees were divided into two groups: the Garcia family and other families.
Case studies are useful when the research question asks “how” and “why” things have
occurred, when the question does not require control over behavioral events, and when the
question focuses on contemporary events (Yin 1994). This is the case for this research because
the question is about how the Chan 75 dam has changed these communities and why these
changes have occurred. Further, the story of the Garcia family is a useful case because they lived
in one of the relocated communities, negotiated with AES, received compensation, and have had
their lives greatly altered by the construction of the dam. This allows the changes caused by the
Chan 75 dam to be “transparently observable” (Eisenhardt 1989). Thus, the Garcia family was
used as a case study to understand life before and after the dam.
The heads of the Garcia family are F. Garcia (age 75) and his wife Ev. Garcia (60). They
have 5 daughters: Sa. Garcia (44), O. Garcia (42), Ma. Garcia (41), Mi. Garcia (29), and C.
Garcia (26). They also have 4 sons Si. Garcia (36), En. Garcia (32), A. Garcia (23), and J. Garcia
(15). F. Garcia and Ev. Garcia have 26 grandchildren and 2 greatgrandchildren. These
grandchildren range in age from 1 to 23 years old, and the greatgrandchildren are both 1 year
old. Before the construction of the Chan 75 dam, the entire family lived on one farm and largely
in one house in Valle el Rey. Now, the family is scattered across Panama. 9 members of the
Garcia were interviewed: F. Garcia, Sa. Garcia, A. Garcia, En. Garcia, Si. Garcia, Ma. Garcia, O.
Garcia, Mi. Garcia, & Ev. Garcia. The Garcia family’s houses in Valle el Rey, San Juan,
Changuinola, Soledad de Risco, Nance Risco, and Valle del Risco were visited. Their farms in
Valle el Rey, San Juan, and Soledad de Risco were also visited.
Community members from 6 other families were also interviewed. These interviews were
conducted to support the case study of the Garcia family by expanding the scope of the research.
Only one member of each family was interviewed. Their houses and farms were not visited. All
of their families lived in the corregimiento of Nance del Risco before Chan 75 was built and still
live within the corregimiento today. Community members 1, 2, and 3 lived in Valle el Rey
before the dam. Community member 4 lived in Nance Risco. Community member 5 lived in
Changuinola Arriba. Community member 6 lived in Guayabal. All of these interviewees had
been impacted by the construction of the dam.
In order to ensure safe research design and to protect interviewees, the research proposal
and interview guide were reviewed and approved by a Local Review Board (LRB). The
interview guide has been annexed in both Spanish and English (Appendix I). Before each
interview, verbal consent was obtained. All interviews were conducted in Spanish. No minors
were interviewed. All interviews were semi-structured (Kalio et al. 2016). All names have been
13

changed to protect the anonymity of the interviewees. All interviewees were found through the
assistance of the Garcia family and were conducted in April 2018.
Results
Vegetation Change and Forest Loss
In terms of vegetation, the average NDVI value before the dam was 0.38 (standard
deviation 0.22) for the area of the lake, 0.48 (0.08) for within 1 kilometer of the lake, 0.47 (0.08)
for between 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake, and 0.43 (0.09) for beyond 2 kilometers of the lake.
The average NDVI value for the entire corregimiento of Nance del Risco before the dam was
0.43 (0.09). After the dam, the average NDVI value was 0.02 (0.13) for the lake, 0.46 (0.10) for
within 1 kilometer of the lake, 0.47 (0.13) for between 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake, and 0.43
(0.07) for beyond 2 kilometers of the lake. The average NDVI value for the entire corregimiento
of Nance del Risco after the dam was 0.43 (0.08). These results are visualized in Figure 1. NDVI
maps for Nance del Risco are shown from before the dam (Map 4) and after the dam (Map 5).

Average NDVI Value for Each Area
0.7

Average NDVI Value

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

Before

0.2

After

0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2

Lake

1 km

2 km

> 2 km

Area of Interest

Figure 1: The average NDVI value for each area of interest before and after the construction of
the Chan 75 dam. Lake represents the current area of the lake created by the Chan 75 dam in
Nance del Risco. 1 km represents the area within 1 kilometer of the current lake area in Nance
del Risco. 2 km represents the area between 1 and 2 kilometers of the current lake area in Nance
del Risco. > 2 km represents the area beyond 2 kilometers of the lake in Nance del Risco. Error
bars represent one standard deviation.
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Map 4: NDVI map of Nance del Risco before the construction of the Chan 75 dam.

Map 5: NDVI map of Nance del Risco after the construction of the Chan 75 dam.
In terms of forest loss, from 2001 to 2016, the corregimiento of Nance del Risco lost
1,089.6 hectares of forest. 883.6 of these hectares were lost after 2007. The number of hectares
of forest lost for the corregimiento each year is shown in Figure 2. Disaggregating the data into
the areas of interest, the lake in Nance del Risco lost 121.4 hectares of which 112.3 hectares were
lost after 2007. From 2001 to 2016, within one kilometer of the lake in Nance del Risco 169.7
hectares of forest were lost, and 149.4 of these hectares were lost after 2007. From 2001 to 2016,
105.7 hectares of forest loss occurred between 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake in Nance del Risco,
and 84.1 of these hectares were lost after 2007. For the area beyond 2 kilometers, 692.8 hectares
of forest were lost between 2001 and 2016, and 537.8 of these hectares were lost after 2007. The
number of hectares of forest lost for each area of interest each year is shown in Figure 3.
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The calculated area for each area of interest in Nance del Risco is as follows: 587
hectares for the lake, 2,396 hectares for within 1 kilometer of the lake, 2,314 hectares for
between 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake, 99,796 hectares for beyond 2 kilometers of the lake, and
105,093 hectares for the entire corregimiento of Nance del Risco. The hectares of forest loss
were divided by the area of each of these for each year to calculate the percent of forest loss that
year. These results are displayed in Figure 4. For the area of the lake, 20.7% of hectares lost
forest from 2001 to 2016 of which 19.1% occurred after 2007. For the area within 1 kilometer of
the lake, 7.08% of hectares lost forest from 2001 to 2016 of which 6.23% occurred after 2007.
For the area between 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake, 4.57% of hectares lost forest from 2001 to
2016, 3.63% of which occurred after 2007. For the area beyond 2 kilometers of the lake, 1.23%
of hectares lost forest from 2001 to 2016, and 1.08% of this occurred after 2007. Finally, for the
entire corregimiento of Nance del Risco, 1.04% of hectares lost forest between 2001 and 2016,
and of this, 0.84% occurred after 2007. A map of the forest loss data for the corregimiento is
shown in Map 6.
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Figure 2: The hectares of forest loss each year for the entire corregimiento of Nance del Risco.
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Figure 3: The hectares of forest loss each year for each area of interest. Lake represents the
current area of the lake created by the Chan 75 dam in Nance del Risco. 1 km represents the area
within 1 kilometer of the current lake area in Nance del Risco. 2 km represents the area between
1 and 2 kilometers of the current lake area in Nance del Risco. > 2 km represents the area beyond
2 kilometers of the lake.
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Figure 4: The percent of forest loss each year for each area of interest. Lake represents the
current area of the lake created by the Chan 75 dam in Nance del Risco. 1 km represents the area
within 1 kilometer of the current lake area in Nance del Risco. 2 km represents the area between
1 and 2 kilometers of the current lake area in Nance del Risco. > 2 km represents the area beyond
2 kilometers of the lake.
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Map 6: Map of forest loss from 2001 to 2016.
Garcia Family
In 1980, F. Garcia bought an 83-hectare farm along the Changuinola River. In 1996, F.
Garcia, his wife Ev. Garcia, and their children moved to the farm with the intentions of living
there permanently. In 2001, F. Garcia was one of the five founders of the community Valle el
Rey which his farm became a part of (F. Garcia 4/20). F. Garcia had two houses: one in the
community so younger children could go to school and one large house on the farm where most
of the family lived. Sa. Garcia often stayed in the house in the community to take care of the
children (Sa. Garcia 4/21). Only Ma. Garcia had a separate house on the farm for her own family
(Ma. Garcia 4/25).
Their farm had two main sections: the plains and the mountains. They lived and worked
in the plains because they were relatively flat and near the river. The river was beautiful, and
they used it for many things. For example, they bathed and washed their clothes in the river (F.
Garcia 4/20). It had many fish that were an important part of their diet. En. Garcia listed 10
different species of fish that they used to be able to find in the river along with shrimp. In the
plains, they had both pasture and agriculture. In the pasture, they had 16-18 cows, 4-5 horses, 1214 pigs, and 80-90 chickens. For agriculture, they grew a wide variety of plants including
bananas, plantains, taro, yucca, pineapple, yams, yampee, cacao, coconuts, oranges, and other
vegetables. They also had 7-8 “huacas,” or large archaeological artifacts made by the Ngobe long
ago. On the other hand, they conserved the forests in the mountains because they needed the
animals, wood, and water from the mountains (En. Garcia 4/21).
During that time, it was a 4 to 5 hour walk to the leave the community, but this could be
sped up by taking a boat or horse (Sa. Garcia 4/21). There was sufficient space, sufficient water,
and sufficient food then for the entire family. The family could even trade bananas, fish, and
other foods for goods that they needed, and that was easy (En. Garcia 4/23). Many of the family
members interviewed used the same word to describe life before the dam came: “tranquila” (F.
Garcia 4/20, Sa. Garcia 4/21, En. Garcia 4/23, & Ev. Garcia 4/27). Similarly, many of the family
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members described life before as directly better (F. Garcia 4/20, Sa. Garcia 4/21, En. Garcia
4/23, O. Garcia 4/27, Ev. Garcia 4/27).
Between 2005 and 2006, AES sent representatives to visit community members in the
area. They visited the Garcia family and spoke with F. Garcia. They described the dam that
would be built and that he would need to move. However, they promised him that he and his
family would receive a better life. They promised F. Garcia that he could continue working his
current farm and that he would receive a new, better farm. They promised him new, better
houses that they would own with running water and free electricity. They promised the family a
motor boat for transportation to their current farm after the lake was filled. On top of that, they
promised him money as compensation. For the community of Valle el Rey, they promised there
would be a new center of health, a new, better school, and a road to the community (En. Garcia
4/24).
In 2007, construction of the Chan 75 dam began. In 2008, F. Garcia was brought to
Panama City for formal negotiations with AES. AES did not negotiate with any of the other
members of the Garcia family (F. Garcia 4/20). Because the reservoir would flood the
community of Valle el Rey, AES moved the community to the mountains to the east within the
concession. After negotiations, F. Garcia received a new house in this new community and
money (F. Garcia 4/20). Sa. Garcia also received a new house there (Sa. Garcia 4/21). Ma.
Garcia received money for a new house (Ma. Garcia 4/25). En. Garcia also received some money
(En. Garcia 4/22). Finally, Si. Garcia received a very small amount of money (Si. Garcia 4/24).
Ev. Garcia received nothing because wives were not considered (Ev. Garcia 4/27). O. Garcia,
Mi. Garcia, C. Garcia, A. Garcia, J. Garcia, and any grandchildren received nothing because they
were too young at the time (A. Garcia 4/22, En. Garcia 4/22, O. Garcia 4/27, & Mi. Garcia 4/27).
They then received these compensations. For the two houses in Valle el Rey, temporary wooden
houses were provided until the completion of the replacement houses in 2015 (En. Garcia 4/23).
After the Garcia family had to leave their home in Valle el Rey, life changed, and
everything was different. In 2009, F. Garcia bought a new, 5.5-hectare farm in San Juan. In
2010, construction of the dam ended, and the lake filled (Picture 1). Of the 83 hectares of their
original farm, 28 flooded, and 55 remained (F. Garcia 4/20). All of the plains flooded, including
their original house, pasture, and agriculture (Picture 2). That year, F. Garcia bought a small
house in Changuinola, and En. Garcia used his money to buy his own 5-hectare farm in Soledad
de Risco (En. Garcia 4/22). Ma. Garcia used her money to expand her husband’s house in Valle
del Risco (Ma. Garcia 4/25). Si. Garcia used his money to improve what was left of their old
farm (Si. Garcia 4/24). Then, the money was gone (En. Garcia 4/22).
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Picture 1: Photo of the Chan 75 dam.

Picture 2: Photo of the flooded old farm near where the old house was.
Today, the family is scattered. F. Garcia moves between his houses in Valle el Rey, San
Juan, and Changuinola, working both the old farm and the farm in San Juan. He believes that the
difficulties of all this travel are causing his failing health (F. Garcia 4/20). Sa. Garcia lives in her
house in Valle el Rey (Sa. Garcia 4/21). Si. Garcia lives in F. Garcia’s house in Valle el Rey (Si.
Garcia 4/24). Ev. Garcia lives in the small house in Changuinola with O. Garcia, Mi. Garcia, J.
Garcia, and their children (Ev. Garcia 4/27). A. Garcia lives on the San Juan farm (A. Garcia
4/22). En. Garcia moves between his farm in Soledad de Risco, his family in Nance Risco, and F.
Garcia’s house in Valle el Rey (En. Garcia 4/18). Ma. Garcia lives with her husband and their
children in Valle del Risco (Ma. Garcia 4/25). Finally, C. Garcia lives in Valle de Anton with her
family (Sa. Garcia 4/21). Many of the family members mentioned difficulties seeing their family
after the dam was built (F. Garcia 4/20, Sa. Garcia 4/21, A. Garcia 4/22, En. Garcia 4/23, Si.
Garcia 4/24, Ma. Garcia 4/25, O. Garcia 4/27, & Ev. Garcia 4/27).
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In Valle el Rey, the houses that F. Garcia and Sa. Garcia received are nice but have
serious problems (Sa. Garcia 4/21; Picture 3). The houses are connected to the electrical grid and
have outlets and lightbulb slots, but the electricity is not free like promised. Instead, it is too
expensive for most people in the community to afford, including F. Garcia and Sa. Garcia. The
houses do have running water, but the system that the water comes from does not have enough
water for the community, so the water normally runs out one to two times per day (Sa. Garcia
4/21 & En. Garcia 4/22). The houses often leak when it rains as well (Sa. Garcia 4/21). No one in
the community has received any form of documentation for their houses either, meaning that
although they live in the houses, they do not own them (Sa. Garcia 4/21 & En. Garcia 4/22).
Although the community has a center of health, no one works there, and the road to the
community is dangerously steep (En. Garcia 4/20). Additionally, since the lake filled,
mosquitoes have become a consistent annoyance (Sa. Garcia 4/21 & En. Garcia 4/22). However,
the greatest problem that the new house poses is that it is now difficult to reach the old farm (F.
Garcia 4/20, Sa. Garcia 4/21, En. Garcia 4/23, Si. Garcia 4/24, & Ev. Garcia 4/27). To reach the
old farm, members of the Garcia family must follow a steep, dangerous, muddy path down the
mountain. Then, they must cross the lake. For this, En. Garcia uses a canoe which takes 20 to 25
minutes (En. Garcia 4/21). On the other hand, Si. Garcia takes a motor boat across, but this costs
money (Si. Garcia 4/24). When they return from the old farm, they must climb the same path up,
often with heavy bags of produce on their back. This has also made fishing less feasible because
access to the water is so difficult. Further, the many species of fish from before have
disappeared, and now there are only tilapia left (En. Garcia 4/21).

Picture 3: Photo of replacement houses in Valle el Rey.
The old farm today has little in common with the farm before the dam. Of the 55 hectares
still above water, very little is usable because of both the mountainous terrain and the shade of
the trees (Picture 4). Although the dam still allows them to use the farm, it has implemented new
rules as part of the concession. For example, the Garcia family cannot use any of the farm within
50 meters of the lake, and they are not allowed to cut any trees within the concession (which the
entire farm falls within) (En. Garcia 4/21). However, they have recently started to break these
rules because there is not enough food (En. Garcia 4/21 & Si. Garcia 4/24). 1.5 years ago, they
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made a new pasture in the mountain for their animals (Picture 5). Before the new pasture, they
had to pay another family to keep their animals, but that was too expensive. However, the new
pasture is dangerous because of the terrain, and last year one of their cows fell to its death. They
now have 2 cows, no horses, 6 pigs, and about 20 chickens on this farm (En. Garcia 4/21).
Further, there is little agriculturally that can be done with this land, aside from growing wood
trees which they are not allowed to cut or sell. Thus, one year ago, En. Garcia, Si. Garcia, and
Sa. Garcia’s children started to use the land within 50 meters of the lake to grow cacao and
plantains to eat (En. Garcia 4/21 & Si. Garcia 4/24). They plan to expand their farming in these
areas because they still do not have enough food (En. Garcia 4/21). However, the family worries
about future generations being able to use the farm at all because they no longer own it (F.
Garcia 4/20).

Picture 4: Photo of the old farm from Valle el Rey.

Picture 5: Photo of the new pasture on the old farm.
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When the farm in San Juan was purchased, it had been an abandoned farm for about 3 to
4 years (Picture 6). The land was “rastrojo,” essentially full of small trees with some large laurel
trees around the edges. Now, that “rastrojo” has been replaced with mostly plantains with small
amounts of banana, yucca, yams, and maize (En. Garcia 4/27). However, many of the laurel trees
remain because the farm exists within Palo Seco Forest Reserve. Because of this protected area,
the Garcia family must request permission for every tree they cut down. This permission process
requires about 3 to 4 months. The shade from these trees does not cause major problems for the
farm; however, they are cutting them when they have permission still for more farmland (En.
Garcia 4/26). The crops on this farm are grown to be both eaten and sold. However,
transportation to and from the farm is expensive, so it is difficult for the family in Changuinola to
get food from the farm (En. Garcia 4/27). F. Garcia bought and much of the family lives in the
small house in Changuinola because there is not a good school close to San Juan (F. Garcia
4/20).

Picture 6: Photo of the San Juan farm.
Similarly, when En. Garcia purchased his farm in Soledad de Risco, it was an abandoned
farm full of “rastrojo” (Picture 7). However, unlike the relatively flat farm in San Juan, his farm
is mountainous with large forested areas. Of his 5 hectares, only about 1 hectare can be used for
agriculture because of the shade from the larger trees. Like the farm in San Juan, this farm is
within Palo Seco Forest Reserve, so the 3 to 4-month permission process is required for each tree
cut. In the area that he can use, En. Garcia mostly grows cacao and bananas along with some
yampee, yams, taro, and yucca. These crops are only grown to eat, except in the rare case when
there is enough extra to sell. En. Garcia is cutting trees as he gets permission and plans to
continue to expand to the agricultural area of his farm because there is not enough food (En.
Garcia 4/19). Although he normally lives on the farm in Soledad de Risco, his wife and children
normally live in Nance Risco because there is no school near his farm.
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Picture 7: Photo of En. Garcia’s farm in Soledad de Risco.
Nance Risco is the capital of the corregimiento and the only community with a colegio
within it. The dam provides electricity to the street lights and houses that can afford it, but many
houses still have no electricity, including En. Garcia’s family (En. Garcia 4/18). After the dam
was built, most houses were upgraded from traditional thatched roofs to aluminum roofs. For
example, En. Garcia’s family’s house in Nance Risco, which is owned by his wife’s father, was
upgraded with the money he earned as a worker for the dam. However, these jobs were shortlived, and then the money was gone. The new, paved road that AES built to the dam has
improved transportation to the community, but the old road that AES also promised to fix
remains unpaved (En. Garcia 4/19). Like Valle el Rey, there is a center of health, but it has no
workers. Before the dam, much of the area of Nance Risco was farms, but Nance Risco has since
grown as families have moved in from the flooded communities, including En. Garcia’s family.
These past farms can be evidenced by the banana and cacao trees still scattered around the edges
of the community (En. Garcia 4/23).
Finally, Ma. Garcia and her family in Valle del Risco have no farm. They survive by
making and selling clothes, but they have problems with having sufficient food. Before, they
lived close to the school in Valle el Rey, and it was only a 5-minute walk to school for her
children. However, now in Valle del Risco, her children must walk 30 minutes to school.
Because she is so separate from the rest of the family, she especially has difficulties seeing them
now. Because they have no farm, she also must walk 3 to 4 hours to buy vegetables. These
problems are only worsened by the poor conditions of the road, which AES promised to fix but
did not (Ma. Garcia 4/25). In total, all of the family members interviewed agreed that there are
no benefits from the dam for them or their family (F. Garcia 4/20, Sa. Garcia 4/21, A. Garcia
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4/22, En. Garcia 4/23, Si. Garcia 4/24, Ma. Garcia 4/25, O. Garcia 4/27, Mi. Garcia 4/27, & Ev.
Garcia 4/27).

Map 7: Map of Garcia family farm locations before and after the construction of the Chan 75
dam. The left map represents the farm before the dam. The right represents (from top to bottom)
the San Juan farm, the Soledad de Risco farm, and the old farm.
Other Families
Community members 1, 2, and 3 were from Valle el Rey before it was flooded by the
dam. Community member 1 was another one of the founders of Valle el Rey. He organized the
school in Charco la Pava. His family had lived on their 54-hectare farm in the valley since 1962.
Before the dam, life was “tranquila,” and they lived by the Ngobe culture. They had many
animals including cows, pigs, turkeys, horses, and chickens, and there were many fish. They
could bathe and wash in the river. They sold cacao and coffee, and they could walk, take boats,
or ride horses for transportation. Then the company came, and they were promised a better life, a
“palacio” in the new Valle el Rey, another house in Changuinola, an education for their children,
and $5,000 for the trees on their land that would be flooded. After negotiations, they actually
received a small house in Changuinola and a small amount of money. Now, 13 hectares of their
farm are underwater: the plains that they farmed on before. The 41 hectares left are mountainous,
and they cannot legally cut the trees there because it is within the concession nor do they have
the rights to their farm anymore. They now live in a wooden house they built themselves in Valle
el Rey, and their children live in Changuinola. They still have no electricity. Walking to what
remains of their farm is very difficult because the community is high on the mountain. They no
longer have the space to keep animals, and only tilapia remain in the lake. There is not enough
water in the community now either. Even though there is a road to the community, there is no
transportation, so they cannot sell cacao or coffee anymore (Community member 1 4/21).
Community member 2 was a woman that lived independently in Valle el Rey before the
dam. Before the dam, she had a store, a farm, a boat, and animals, and there were many fish in
the river. She also described life as “tranquila” and believes that her life is worse now in every
way. Although she was living independently, AES never spoke to her, and she received no
compensation from them. Now, her entire farm and her old store are underwater. Her boat cannot
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pass the dam, so she has no transportation. She also has no place to keep animals. She has to live
with the family of Community member 1 because she has no house. She has 4 sons, and she
worries that she has no way to better their lives and has nothing to leave for them (Community
member 2 4/21).
Community member 3 was a son of another one of the founders of Valle el Rey. Before
the dam, his family had a large farm, cows, pigs, and free space, and there were plenty of fish.
When the company came he was only 15. Although some of his family members received
compensation from the dam, he was too young, so he received nothing. The dam promised his
mother $25 per person, but they did not complete this promise. Now, a little land of his family
farm is left above the water, but the land is mountainous. It is also impossible to keep cows or
pigs there. The rest of his family still lives in the new community of Valle el Rey, and they share
what is left of the farm to survive. He lives in a wooden house that his family built in the
community, but he still has no electricity. The community suffers problems with insufficient
water now and the lack of workers in the center of health. There is also no transportation now,
and the quality of the road is poor. Although he was too young to receive compensation from
AES, he now has a wife and children to take care of, but he has nothing (Community member 3
4/21).
Community member 4 was from Nance Risco and had a farm close to the dam but not
within the concession. However, AES needed to build the road to the dam through his farm. At
first, they promised him $70,000 and 4 houses for families living on the farm. Although they
built the road through his farm, he has received nothing from AES, and they have not contacted
him since. The area that the company took previously had cacao, wood trees, medicinal plants,
and vegetables. He lost these without compensation as well. The road also divided his farm
which has caused him problems with cultivation. Further, his farm touches the Changuinola
River downriver from the dam. The river is now much smaller, and the fish have disappeared.
The river is also no longer deep enough to cross by boat. The road has not improved his
transportation to his farm either, and he still has no electricity at his house in Nance Risco
(Community member 4 4/23).
Community member 5 was from Changuinola Arriba before it was flooded by the dam.
He moved there in 1980 and had a 12-hectare farm there. On that farm, he grew cacao, bananas,
oranges, taro, and yams. In 2005, the company came and promised him $300,000, a new farm,
and a better house in compensation for his farm flooding. However, now his farm is entirely
underwater, and he has received nothing from the dam. Now he has to live with his family in
Soledad de Risco, and he has nowhere to farm or work. He has problems getting sufficient food,
and these problems are made worse by there being fewer fish and animals after the dam. He
concluded that now, “solo tengo mi gatito,” or all he has is his kitten (Community member 5
4/19).
Community member 6 was from Guayabal before it was flooded by the dam. Before the
dam, his life was “tranquila.” He had a farm by the river. He used the river for water, and there
were many fish. He could also easily walk or ride his horse for transportation. Then, a
representative from AES came in a helicopter and promised him a better life. They promised him
a new house in Guayabal, money for his land, a boat, a university education for his son, and free
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electricity. They also promised a road, a school, and a center of health in Guayabal. After
negotiations, he only received $5,000 for the 5 hectares of his farm that are underwater and
nothing else. The community of Guayabal received no replacement houses, no electricity, no
road, no school, and no center of health (Picture 8). The land left from his farm is mountainous
and poor for agriculture. Further, transportation to that land is very difficult and expensive
because Guayabal is across the lake and far from any road. Now, he has to live with his family in
Valle el Rey because he lost his house. He complained that everything now costs money, and the
money he received quickly disappeared on food and clothes. Because food costs money and he
has no land to work, he has problems with getting sufficient food (Community member 6 4/25).
All 6 community members interviewed agreed that there had been no benefits from the dam for
them or their family (Community member 1 4/21, Community member 2 4/21, Community
member 3 4/21, Community member 4 4/23, Community member 5 4/19, & Community
member 6 4/25).

Picture 8: Photo of the community of Guayabal. There are no replacement houses in this
community nor is there a school or center of health.
Discussion
Land Use Changes
In terms of land use change, the NDVI and forest loss analyses reveal that vegetation has
generally decreased around the reservoir while forest has decreased across Nance del Risco since
the construction of the Chan 75 dam. For NDVI, the decrease in vegetation is immediately
apparent for the area of the lake formed by the dam. This is reasonable because, as the interviews
reveal, much of the land flooded was a mixture of agriculture and pasture. This is supported by
the fact that the average NDVI value for the lake area before the dam was lower than those of the
other areas since agriculture and pasture generally have lower NDVI values than forest.
Similarly, the greater average NDVI values within 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake area support the
assertion in interviews that the mountains around the lake were conserved forests before the dam.
The average NDVI for the areas within 1 and 2 kilometers of the lake after the dam are lower
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than before the dam, and the impact of that vegetation change generally decreases with
increasing distance from the flooded area. However, these differences are slight, and the
vegetation for the area beyond 2 kilometers has actually increased slightly. These indicate
differing changes in vegetation in Nance del Risco since the construction of the Chan 75 dam.
However, it is difficult to ascertain from NDVI how much of this loss was forest versus
agriculture and whether or not the timing of this change corresponded with the construction of
the dam. Additionally, although NDVI obtained from Landsat-7 ETM+ and Landsat-8 OLI are
highly linearly correlated, values can differ by up to 0.05 on average, and Landsat-8 OLI
generally estimates greater NDVI values than Landsat-7 ETM+ (Li et al. 2014). This effect may
have influenced this calculation’s ability to detect all decreases in vegetation.
That said, the forest loss analysis can shed some light on these questions. This analysis
reveals that, across all scales in Nance del Risco, there was generally greater forest loss from
2008 to 2012, with spikes in 2008, 2011, and 2012. Based on the interviews, construction of
Chan 75 began in 2007 and ended in 2010, with the lake filling in 2010. Thus, it is likely that
these spikes are a direct result of these events. The spike in 2008 could be reflective of the
clearing of farms by AES that began in 2007 with construction. The spike in 2011 could reflect
the final clearing of farms and flooding of the reservoir. The spike in 2012, however, occurs after
these events have passed, perhaps reflecting the clearing of new farms by displaced families.
Additionally, the larger areas of interest show forest loss beyond the lake following a similar
pattern. This could also be indicative of deforestation caused by the relocation of these
communities. The Garcia family, for example, were forced to move in 2008 and expanded into
new farms in 2009 and 2010. Also, the fact that the lake area only shows 19.1% forest loss since
the construction of the dam despite obviously being flooded could be indicative of how much of
the area was agricultural and pastoral, which both NDVI analysis and interviews support.
Finally, since 2014, forest loss appears to have returned to its original rate, indicating that the
impacts of the dam on land change may have largely already occurred. It is important to
consider, however, that satellite imagery has been shown to be unable distinguish between forest
and agroforestry in other indigenous communities in Panama (Runk et al. 2010). Thus, these
numbers are likely underestimates of land use change, and it is possible that agroforestry
expansion is occurring despite not being evidenced by the forest loss analysis. At the very least,
this is the case for the Garcia family.
The Garcia family had an 83-hectare farm before the dam. They used the 28 hectares of
plans for agriculture and pastures, but the remaining 55 hectares were conserved because they
were mountainous. However, because the dam flooded the 28 hectares of their old farm that they
used for food, they were forced to expand their land use. In 2009, they bought the 5.5-hectare
farm in San Juan. In doing so, they cleared 3-4 years of secondary succession, and now only the
laurel trees remain. Additionally, that secondary succession has largely been replaced by a
monoculture of plantains. In 2010, the lake filled, flooding what remained of the land in the
valley. That same year, En. Garcia bought his own 5-hectare farm. Again, he cleared 3-4 years of
secondary succession. Thus, at least for the Garcia family, deforestation was at first displaced
outside of the immediate area of the reservoir. However, the shade of the large trees and the
regulations of Palo Seco Forest Reserve has slowed the conversion of succession and forest to
agriculture. Within the last 2 years, this agricultural expansion has continued for the Garcia
family as they have started using the old farm again for pasture and agriculture. Now, the Garcia
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family plans to further expand their agriculture on all three of their farms in the future. On the
other hand, none of the other 6 families had obtained more land since the construction of the
dam; all had only lost land. That said, community members 1 and 3 mentioned that they were
now working the mountainous areas of their old farms which they did not work before.
Livelihood Changes
Recognizing that land use change has, at least in part, taken the form of agricultural
expansion, the natural next question is why. Based on the interviews, the answer is relatively
simple: food. Many of the interviews with both the Garcia family and other families mentioned
that there was less food after the dam and that they struggled with that. Across the interviews, the
loss of land, the loss of animals, and the loss of fish were cited as important reasons for that loss
of food. Although the other families did not have the opportunity to buy new lands to expand
their land use, they too cite lack of food as a major issue after the dam. Further, this research
does not even address changes in food quality and nutrition alongside the decreasing quantity of
food. These issues have only been exacerbated by strict land use rules within Palo Seco Forest
Reserve and the concession. On the one hand, this is obviously a result of these families losing
parts or of all of their original farms to the construction of the dam. However, the second half of
the problem lies directly with AES.
As part of the concession, it was AES’s legal and financial duty to provide compensation
to those affected both directly and indirectly by the construction of the Chan 75 dam. Although
AES promised that compensation (with these promises taking many forms), they failed to deliver
it adequately. Some families were completely ignored and received no compensation at all, like
community members 2 and 5. Others received compensation that was obviously inadequate, like
community member 6 who only received $5,000. Finally, even those that were relatively
successful in negotiations received inadequate compensation. This is in part because AES
focused on providing new infrastructure and not livelihoods. Further, the new Valle el Rey does
not have sufficient water, and these families have legal rights to neither their new houses nor
their old farms.
For those that received money, all agreed that it was quickly gone. For the Garcia family,
that money was spent on houses and farms. For others, they could only afford food and clothing.
Now, these families have little to no money and no effective way to earn more. However, now
goods and services also cost money and bartering has become less and less feasible. Although
the dam has the potential to provide electricity to these families, that electricity costs money. Of
the families interviewed, none currently living in Nance del Risco have electricity despite living
within walking distance of a 223 MW dam.
Transportation has also become ironically more difficult for these families despite having
access to a road. Where before they were able to easily walk, ride horses, or take boats between
destinations, that is often no longer an option. The dam blocks boats from going downriver, and
the lake is too large to easily canoe around. Accessing farms now requires steep and dangerous
hikes through the mountains on muddy trails. These trails are also impossible for horses to
navigate, making horses effectively useless. Although it is possible to take motor boats and cars
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after the construction of the dam, these options cost money and thus are often just as impossible
as they were before.
Transportation issues are especially pertinent for the Garcia family. Although the Garcia
family was relatively successful in negotiations and received more compensation than any other
interviewed family, that compensation has itself created problems for the family. Although the
houses and money they received have given them advantages over other families, they have also
driven the family apart. Where before the Garcia family lived together on one farm, they are now
split between Valle el Rey, Nance del Risco, Soledad de Risco, Valle del Risco, San Juan,
Changuinola, and Valle de Anton. This has made it both time-consuming and expensive to see
their family. Additionally, while other families are forced to continue working what is left of
their original farms or have no farms, the Garcia family is now split between three different
farms. These farms together still do not have the area or quality for agricultural production of
their original farm before the dam. Again, transportation between these farms requires both time
and money. Much of the family blames these difficulties of transportation and additional work
for the worsening health of F. Garcia.
Another common concern among all families was that, despite all the problems they face
now, the worst problems are for the future generations. Again, families have no legal rights to
their new houses or their old farms. That means that there is no guarantee that their children or
their children’s children will be able to continue to use these. Further, AES has not provided for
the future. As the Garcia family and community member 3 reveal, nonadults were not considered
by AES during negotiations for compensation. Of F. Garcia’s nine children, only four received
any form of compensation. Many of these uncompensated youth now have families of their own
to support. Further, since negotiations, 15 grandchildren and 2 greatgrandchildren have been
born in the Garcia family. These children were certainly not considered when AES was
providing compensation to families. Thus, as these families continue to grow, they must continue
to do more with less. With these impacts in mind, it is no surprise that all interviewees, both in
the Garcia family and in the other 6 families, agreed that there have been no benefits for them or
their family from the Chan 75 dam. Given the number of families impacted, this is likely to
create instability in Nance del Risco and Bocas del Toro at large over time.
Comparison with Brazil’s Tucurui Dam
Although in some ways Chan 75’s circumstances are unique, many of the land use and
livelihood changes described here are not. In Latin America, the oppression of indigenous
communities is a historical pattern for dam construction (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2010). The
problems created by Chan 75 are especially reminiscent of those created by Brazil’s Tucurui
dam. Opened in 1984, the Tucurui dam flooded 178,300 hectares of forest. However, forest loss
was not limited to the flooding alone. Deforestation was also caused by the people relocated
from the submergence area. Others were also drawn by the new infrastructure, market, and
employment opportunities created by the dam, resulting in further forest loss (Fearnside 2001).
Similarly, Chan 75 has resulted in both vegetation and forest loss from the creation of its
reservoir. However, as the analyses here show, vegetation and forest loss have also occurred
outside of the actual lake area, both within 1 to 2 kilometers of the lake and within the entire
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corregimiento. As in the case of the Tucurui dam, it is likely that this additional deforestation is
caused by both the development of infrastructure around the dam and the displacement of people
from the submerged area. The Garcia family, again, acts as one such case in which a family
displaced by the dam has led to increased deforestation to survive.
The Tucurui dam also created large-scale social issues. An estimated 32,871 people were
dislocated by the construction of the dam. Areas flooded by the dam included parts of three
indigenous reserves. ELETRONORTE, the company that built the Tucurui dam, was in charge of
compensating affected families. However, in most cases they only provided compensation in the
forms of cash payments. While this relieved the company of its legal responsibility, the money
quickly evaporated from these people with little to no experience dealing with finances. Within
months, most families had nothing left of their compensation, and the displaced population were
reduced to extreme poverty and essentially left to fend for themselves. Further, by 1993, only
103 of the 1,500 resettled families had received land titles (Fearnside 1999).
Likewise, 1,000 people were relocated for Chan 75, and those people were mostly
Ngobe. The four communities flooded were indigenous and were theoretically annex areas. In
this case, AES was in charge of compensating the affected families. Similarly, AES focused on
providing compensation in the form of cash payments that quickly vanished according to the
interviews here. Years after the completion of Chan 75, the interviewed families had nothing left
of the monetary compensation and only the Garcia family, who was able to buy farms with the
land, had anything left to show for it. The families interviewed often cited lack of sufficient
money and food as problems caused by the dam, reflecting similar extreme poverty to that
caused by the Tucurui dam. Finally, according to the interviews here, no families resettled for the
construction of Chan 75 have received land titles.
In some ways, it appears history has repeated itself with the construction of Chan 75.
Despite the Tucurui dam having been completed more than 20 years before the construction of
Chan 75, the same issues of indigenous land rights, deforestation, and unfair compensation are
now present. However, in April 2016, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) had its first hearing on the problems with resettlement caused by Chan 75 as part of
Case 12.717 (IACHR 2016). Still, as Panama, Central America, and much of the world continue
to push for more and more hydroelectric dams, perhaps it is time to reconsider the benefits and
costs of dams and the impacts they have on nearby communities.
Conclusion
Based on Law 10, Nance del Risco should be an annex area, and the Ngobe that live there
should have complete control over their land and resources. Instead, Palo Seco Forest Reserve
prevents the Ngobe from having any legal land rights. Because of this, the Panamanian
government was able to grant a dam concession to AES against the will of the people that live
there. Although, Chan 75 provides electricity and money to Bocas del Toro and Panama as a
whole, it provides little to nothing to the people of Nance del Risco. Instead, families in these
communities, like the Garcia family and the 6 other interviewed families, now lack sufficient
transportation, money, and food. AES has thus failed to fairly negotiate, relocate, and
compensate community inhabitants that were directly or indirectly affected by the project. In
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turn, the Garcia family and others have expanded their agriculture to survive, and both forest and
vegetation loss have occurred in Nance del Risco and beyond. Without land rights or sufficient
resources, these people worry about their families and future generations. However, they must
also worry about future dams as the Panamanian government continues to push new
hydroelectric projects. Chan II, for example, is currently scheduled to enter operation in 2020
(Secretaria Nacional de Energia 2016). Now, all that is left for the Garcia family and the people
of Nance del Risco are their memories of when life was “tranquila.”
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Appendix I
Interview Guide
Español
Me llamo Patrick McKenzie, y soy estudiante. Estoy estudiando los impactos de la represa Chan
75 en la gente de las comunidades cercanas. ¿Puedo preguntarle sobre sus experiencias con la
presa? ¿Puedo escribir sus respuestas para mi proyecto?
¿Cómo era su vida antes de la represa?
¿Cómo es su vida después de la represa?
¿Qué le prometió la empresa de la represa?
¿Qué recibió de la empresa de la represa?
¿Cómo han cambiado sus fincas desde la construcción de la represa?
¿Qué beneficios ha dado la construcción de la represa?
¿Qué problemas ha causado la construcción de la represa?
English
My name is Patrick McKenzie, and I am a student. I am studying the impacts of the Chan 75
dam on the people of the nearby communities. Can I ask you about your experiences with the
dam? Can I write your responses for my project?
How was your life before the dam?
How is your life after the dam?
What did the dam company promise you?
What did you receive from the dam company?
How have your farms changed since the construction of the dam?
What benefits has the construction of the dam given?
What problems has the construction of the dam caused?
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